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‘Sod them, I’m English’: The changing status of the ‘majority’ English in post-devolution Britain

As well as prompting an urgent re-assessment of constitutional and legislative matters, processes of devolution have also contributed to a series of wide-ranging debates on identity in Britain. Yet, outside of survey data and a growing body of work looking to assess the status of minorities in Britain, relatively little has been heard from the wider population. This is particularly true for those who constitute the majority group within Britain, the English. 

In this paper, I want to offer a complementary perspective by using data from qualitative interviews to explore the ways in which members of the ‘ethnic majority’ in England discuss these issues. The findings suggest a tentative, but noticeable, shift towards an English identity, which is often defined as a necessary response to the increasing assertiveness of ‘other’ national groups within Britain. 
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Introduction

In May 2009, The Times newspaper published the results of a survey, which suggested that, ‘devolution is now widely accepted’ in Britain (Riddell, 2009). The report, designed to mark 10 years since the British Labour government granted devolution to both Scotland and Wales​[1]​, echoed many of the findings of polls, carried out over the preceding decade. Most indicate that while there has been a shift away from the identity category of ‘British’, the majority of people do not consider constitutional change to be a primary concern (Curtice & Heath, 2000, Curtice & Sandford, 2004, Curtice, 2006). What is interesting about these results, is the degree to which they have largely confounded those who warned that devolution would lead to the break-up of Britain and expressed concerns about the likely response from the English population (See Barnett, 1997: 302). 

In the latter case, the work of Susan Condor and her colleagues (2000, 2008, Abell et al, 2006, Condor & Abell, 2006, Condor et al, 2006) has been instructive, demonstrating how discussions about (national) identity and belonging among the English are often marked by disinterest, appeals to moderation and a desire to avoid the imputation of prejudice. These findings tie in rather well with Tom Nairn’s (1977) seminal argument that the English, as the most powerful group within Britain, tend to downplay their position by emphasising ideas around equality and civility, with nationalism becoming associated with the irrational ‘other’. 

These studies are important for at least two reasons. First, they sensitise us to the ways in which an apparent ‘agnosticism towards nationalism’ (Kumar, 2000: 577) among English people is actually used to define self/other. Second, it draws attention to the attitudes and beliefs of a group that has been the subject of relatively little empirical research​[2]​. Part of the reason for this lacuna may be that debates In Britain around (national) identity and belonging have tended to focus on ‘other’ people, generally those, participating in / advocating ‘nationalist’ movements or categorised as ethnic minorities. However, discussions about the status of minority groups are almost always framed in relation to the presence of a taken-for-granted majority, who represent the unmarked or default category. 

In this paper, I want to shed further light on the status of the ethnic majority in England but will offer an alternative perspective, which suggests that their dominant, and largely, taken-for-granted position is coming under sustained scrutiny, partly as a result of devolutionary processes. Furthermore, I will show how these changing relations are generating a palpable response among the English, both in terms of how they identify themselves (as English rather than British) and in foregrounding narratives of victimisation, which focus on the (apparent) privileging of ‘other’ national groups in Britain.

Before looking to evidence this argument, the following section examines how the unmarked category of English has largely been a product of Britain’s asymmetrical historical development, driven by processes of both internal and overseas conflict. 

The state of Britain

The British state was legislated into existence in 1707 through Acts of Union between England (and Wales) and Scotland. Over time, a sense of Britishness was forged in relation to a series of religious, economic and then national ‘others’ (Colley, 1996), although there was no ongoing attempt ‘to integrate political, cultural and economic structures [as] in the classical nation-state’ (McCrone, 1997: 585). Therefore, allegiance to Britain was largely secured in relation to empire, the monarchy and other powerful institutions rather than any putative national community (Wellings, 2002). 

Subsequently, mass warfare, welfare provisions and antipathy towards migrant and European ‘others’ have all played a part in defining British identity. All too often these attempts have failed to move beyond a melancholic fixation with recapturing past imperial and military glories (Gilroy, 2004). This reached its apotheosis under Margaret Thatcher, who promised to ‘make Britain great again’, whilst dismantling or privatising many of the social and corporate entities that had defined British power and prestige.

Moreover, Thatcher, like many of her contemporaries, largely equated Britain with England, tending to treat Scotland and Wales as a Labour-supporting irrelevance (Harvie, 2005). This contributed to the perception of a democratic deficit and is one reason why the ‘centrifugal forces [of devolution] that operated at low power until the 1960’s’ (ibid: 427) increased in significance during her time in office. In the contemporary era, New Labour has been the architect of constitutional change, whilst continuing to push a Britishness agenda, notably under the leadership of Gordon Brown, a Scot (Brown, 2006)​[3]​. 

The final point to note about devolution is that while it was designed to deal with nationalist aspirations in Scotland and Wales, it is now, paradoxically, drawing attention to the curious position of the English within Britain. This not only includes their dominant status, demographically, economically and politically, but also the fact that they possess few distinct social, political or cultural institutions (Kumar, 2003) and tend to (con)fuse the idea of English and British (McCrone, 2002). 

W(h)ither England?

As we noted above, much of the existing survey data suggests that English responses to Britain’s changing social and political landscape have been relatively muted. However some observers (Bryant, 2008, Aughey, 2010) have suggested that questions of equity are slowly moving to the fore. At the political level, this has mainly focused on what has been labelled ‘the West Lothian question’; a legislative anomaly that allows Scottish MP’s to vote on English matters but not vice versa. A content analysis of three national newspapers (The Sun, Daily Mail, The Guardian) using Lexis Nexis software, showed that ‘major mentions’ of the ‘West Lothian question’ had risen from seven in 2000, to 211 in 2007. Therefore while it is still obviously not a major issue, at least for the press, it has been growing in prominence. 

Elsewhere, the Barnett formula, designed to allocate the provision of public resources to the constituent nations of Britain on the basis of need, is also coming under increasing scrutiny (Morgan, 2001, Bryant, 2008: 668-9), notably as some London-based media outlets begin to focus on the funding of public services in Scotland and England respectively​[4]​. Similar debates have also emerged in relation to the cultural sphere, with questions being raised over the lack of support for distinctly English cultural practices and institutions (See Kumar, 2003: 251-252). 
These have often focused on the public display and celebration of English nationality, generally linked to St George’s Day (see below) or the exploits of English sports teams. 

Since the late 1990’s there has been a noticeable rise in the number of these events, which are generally marked by the widespread display of national flags and some co-ordinated public activities. However, reporting of these events has often contrasted the (perceived) support given to minority cultural organisations with the activities of English groups, which, it is claimed, are ignored, or, worse, actively suppressed, by government officials (Mahoney, 2005, Daily Mail, 2005, Newton-~Dunn, 2010). 

Finally, there has been a growing interest in defining or mapping English identity within both academic (Colls, 2002, Mandler, 2008, Featherstone, 2009) and popular spheres (Paxman, 1998, Fox, 2004). In the latter case, it is worth noting that contributions to these debates have come from both the right (Heffer, 1999, Scruton, 2004) and left (Bragg, 2006) of the political spectrum. While the former are typified by ‘angry nationalist revivalism’ (Featherstone, 2009: 4), the latter have, often self-consciously, tried to strike a balance between inclusion and populism. That is, between advocating a ‘thin’ version of civic Englishness that is open and liberal and a shared popular culture that can be experienced, idealised and valued (Aughey, 2007: 103-20). 

Theoretical approaches

In terms of building a theoretical framework, I have argued elsewhere (Skey, 2009, 2010) that we need to better understand how social identities (and the institutions and cultural forms that inform them) become, on the one hand, routinised, normalised and taken-for-granted and, then, on the other, subject to increasing scrutiny, (re)negotiation and, perhaps, repudiation. 

My approach takes Billig’s seminal work on banal nationalism (1995) as a staring point but then argues that we need to introduce an element of dynamism into our analyses. This means focusing on processes of heating and cooling, rather than the more static notions of ‘hot’ and banal’ employed by Billig. An obvious example of this is the ways in which global structural transformations are impacting on, and in some cases undermining, established forms of (national) imagination and organisation. 

Here, Bourdieu’s writing on ‘the field of doxa, of that which is taken-for-granted … [or] beyond question’ (2006: 166) and ‘the field of opinion [where] … practical questioning of … a particular way of living is brought about’ (ibid: 168), might also be usefully employed. Bourdieu noted that when an established field of doxa was subject to ongoing scrutiny it often generated a noticeable response as new frameworks of meaning and signification were debated, accommodated or, often, resisted. 

In the latter case, we can try and understand what the undermining of established forms of doxa might mean to those who have relied on it, up until this point, by referencing the work of Harold Garfinkel (2004). Garfinkel pointed to the importance of everyday routines and background expectations in underpinning a (relatively) settled sense of self and place, and the degree to which disruptions to these established frameworks of meaning tended to generate feelings of puzzlement and/or anger. 

In the main part of the paper, I draw on qualitative interviews with people born and brought up in England to examine the ways in which they discussed changing relations between Britain’s constituent nations and the (possible) impact on their own sense of identity. First, I want to outline the main objectives of the research project from which the data was taken, notably with regard to some of the main methodological choices that were made.

Research Project

The research I undertook (2004-7) was designed to explore the articulation of social identities among the ‘ethnic majority’ (white, English-born people) in England. The project was presented as an attempt to collect opinions about the state of the country and group interviews were used in order to identify some of the ways in which people drew on common-sense knowledge and assumptions in making sense of different topics. 

Questions were intended to be as open as possible so as to allow the interviewee’s to draw attention to, and discuss, their own concerns and preferences. They included, what do you dis/like about living here, what has changed over the past 10 years, what are the biggest challenges facing the country and so on. Where topical issues, such as European integration and devolution were not raised during the ‘open’ discussions, I then asked specific questions in order to examine whether they had been overlooked or were simply not relevant to my respondent’s lives. In this respect, it’s important to note, that while the specific subject of devolution was rarely raised in passing, a question dealing with the relationship between the constituent nations of Britain often generated a passionate response.

In total, 21 interviews were carried out with groups across England. ‘Naturally occurring groups’ (Kitzinger, 1995: 302) – friends, work colleagues, family members - were recruited as a means of generating more informal discussions and group size was limited (average was four) so that individual contributions could be more effectively managed. In terms of the sampling strategy, the unit of analysis was shifted from the individual as a representative of a wider social group to ‘thematic content’ (Lunt & Livingstone, 1996: 92) and the possible range of views associated with a particular subject. 

This type of approach is predicated on the notion that the data generated through the initial group discussions will in turn inform who is approached to take part in subsequent interviews. My own strategy involved relying on snowball sampling in the first phases of the recruitment process and then, in the second phase, focusing on those social groups (age, class, region) that I had not been able to recruit up until that point. In this latter case, I contacted a range of organisations, including community groups, schools, sports clubs and so on. 

Once the ideas and opinions from the most recent groups can be broadly identified in the data generated in preceding discussions, then it may be broadly agreed that ‘theoretical saturation’ has occurred and the data collection process ceases (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 188). Transcripts were then coded in detail in NVivo and analysed as a unit for wider linguistic patterns, using Alceste. These findings were used to generate broad themes, which were analysed and reviewed in relation to the wider literature. 

Politics, I don’t even go into that

Perhaps the first thing to note is that a number of the groups I interviewed either expressed no real interest in and/or knowledge of the subject of devolution. As one might expect, this was particularly noticeable in relation to some of the younger groups (aged between 18-25). The following extract, which featured college students in the ‘border’ town of Carlisle, is illustrative and shows the type of non-committal responses that were sometimes given when respondents were asked directly to comment on the topic. 

Interviewer: I didn’t actually realise how close to Scotland Carlisle was. I mean, is the whole thing about devolution, do you know anything about that, with devolution in Scotland …

Fiona: Oh yeah, I knew about that but I didn’t know like how it works out.

Interviewer: Right.

Helen: I’d heard about it but I didn’t know actually what it was or how it affects us really. 

Interviewer: So that’s, that’s not an issue. 

Helen: No.

Interviewer: Not for anyone?

Lee: Politics, I don’t even go into that. It doesn’t matter who you vote for. 

Fiona and Helen’s views reflect much current data concerning popular attitudes towards devolution, where significant numbers know very little about the subject or it’s (potential) ramifications for way in which Britain is governed (Curtice & Sandford, 2004). Lee, meanwhile, displays the attitude of the arch cynic, equating devolution with the tainted subject of ‘politics’ and articulating the increasingly popular view that democratic institutions no longer have any functional value, no matter whom they are designed to serve.  

The second point to note is that while the term ‘devolution’ was used infrequently, many of the groups did talk about the changing relations between the constituent nations of Britain and their own sense of identity. Interestingly, these discussions were often marked by a noticeable degree of ambivalence and uncertainty, as the following extract demonstrates. 

Interviewer: Do you consider yourself to be British or English? 

Keith: English.

Roger: English first and then British. 

Paul: It was the other way round for me at one time …

Jackie: Yes, me too. 

Paul: Yeah, but I have changed my opinion and attitude now …

Interviewer: Why is that? What’s brought about that change? 

Paul: Because … the way that … I was amazed at what the Welsh think about us. Silly thing. Ian [his son] goes to football … erm … goes down to watch Cardiff play … erm …an English team playing them and y’know, the Welsh nationalism really came out. One of his good friends is a Welshman but he doesn’t think very much of the English. 

Sandra: We say though, don’t we, that we are English but I bet if you go way back, certainly in both our … 

Roger: Oh yes.  

Sandra: We’ve both got Irish ancestry so it is almost sort of hypercritical to say we are English. The fact that we were born and bred in England ….

Keith: That gives us the right. 

Sandra: Yes. But we have got Irish ancestry and no doubt if we go way back … you’ve got Welsh as well haven’t you? 

Paul: Well, I’ve got Irish ….

Jackie: The same thing … my grandmother was … 

Paul: If I go back a couple of generations …

Sandra: Ancient origins maybe …

Paul: … but I consider myself English

Interviewer: But that has changed in the past what? Five years, ten years or ….

Paul: Yeah, I would say ten years. From being British … er .. English to being English-British. 

Roger: You see it came home to me when we were in Scotland last year. No, this year.  We passed someone’s window and it had ‘I support Scotland and any team that England are playing’.  

Keith: Yes.

Roger: Y’know. And you think well that’s their attitude… they’ve got that stuck in their window. That’s their attitude. 

Jackie: I don’t feel like that against … 

Roger: But they are …

Jackie: Scotland and Wales at all.

Roger: … they are anti-English.

Paul: Oh yeah. Very definitely. 

Keith: And yet we pay for the upkeep of their elderly. 

Roger: Yes.

Jackie: I do think this political thing is … is a joke (Middlesex Group)

I have quoted this group at length as it shows how individuals ‘build’ an argument, drawing on shared experiences and common assumptions, to make their (collective) point. Perhaps the most significant feature is the marked tension between a previous adherence to a British identity, which is discussed in relation to family history, and an increasing willingness to privilege English over British. In an unusual reversal of the common English (ethnic) versus British (civic) dichotomy (Condor, 2006), an ethnic version of nationality (based on ancestry) is rejected in favour of one that emphasises personal choice. Paul, for example, is willing to acknowledge his Irish background but now defines himself as English, in direct response to Welsh nationalism. In this context, ‘ancient origins’ are trumped by more pressing allegiances.  

Interestingly, the experience of anti-English sentiments not only produces feelings of resentment but also a degree of puzzlement. Jackie, for instance, contrasts Welsh/Scottish antipathy towards the English with her own more reasonable attitude towards them. This concern for what is occurring at the present time not only extends to the expression of anti-English feelings but is also directed at wider political processes, which are labelled a ‘joke’. An unwillingness to take Scottish / Welsh political claims seriously was a feature of the groups who discussed the topic in more detail. This indicates that they view it as a process that has upset what was largely considered to be a settled and satisfactory state of affairs.

Steve: Yeah, I, I, I’m only, I’m only .. um .. really started to call meself English in the last few years because of this devolution business and I said, ‘well, OK, you want to call yourself a Scottish man, you want to call yourself a Welshman, then I’m an Englishman then (Manchester Group)

Rod: The trouble was when Scotland wanted to go independent, Wales wanted to go independent and everything like that, I mean, the thing is, that they were trying to disintegrate their .. y’know, like their British culture and, the thing is, I think this made people say, well, the Scots wanna be on their own, the Welsh wanna be on their own, so we’re English and that’s it (Surrey Group)

John: I used to be British but since they seem to have, made such a great play of wanting their independence and sod them, I’m English.
Interviewer: Who’s they?

John: Well, the Welsh ….

Peter: Welsh, Scots ….(Cheltenham Group)

Steve, Rod and John’s recent retreat into the category of English is again portrayed as a response to the actions of other national groups within Britain. However, it is the term, ‘such a great play’ that is of particular interest here. Rather than taking Scottish claims for ‘independence’ seriously, they are instead portrayed as being akin to a child making continuous and unreasonable demands. John then draws a powerful distinction between his own rational position, in rising above parochial interests, and the truculent ‘other’ who must be taught a lesson for upsetting a previously settled state of affairs. 

In other words, ‘this devolution business’ has forced people to reflect on issues that had, up until that moment, been taken-for-granted, in the process producing feelings of consternation and/or aggravation​[5]​. There is an echo here of Garfinkel’s research on ‘breaching’ (2004), where the disruption of taken-for-granted routines and assumptions was seen to generate tangible feelings of unease and anger. In this case, it is ‘background expectations’ associated with people’s everyday understandings of (national) self and other that have been challenged. 

We’re all the same country

A further example can be used to illustrate the sense of genuine puzzlement, and unease, that (perceived) Scottish/Welsh antipathy towards the English seems to have produced for some:

Ray: ‘I was in Scotland, this little girl, was eight-years old, from England, beautiful little kid, she was on the stage, eight fucking Jocks, eight Jocks, said ‘Get off’ …they all went ‘Boo, boo’ and I’m like, I stood on my seat and went, ‘All of us, we’re all the same country, we’re all the same country, what are you booing an eight-year old child for?

Eddie: The Scottish are more racist against us than we are to them. 

Barry: Yeah, they are. 

Derek: Eh, we’re not fucking racist because England would have supported them’ (Middlesbrough Group) 

Exhibiting a similar sense of bafflement as to the changing relations between groups within Britain as earlier interviewees, but articulated in far starker terms, Ray’s plea echoes a number of the challenges facing the English at the current time. Having, as the dominant group, previously been able to conflate Britain and England as an unproblematic and fairly secure identity, there seems to be a difficulty in understanding why the other national groups within Britain would want to consider changing what appears to them to be a perfectly acceptable arrangement. As a recent caller to a debate on devolution on BBC Radio Five Live pointedly asked; ‘Why does Scotland want to be separate from all of us? Why can’t we just be Great Britain?’ (30/11/09). 

These types of argument overlook the unequal relations between the different groups within Britain, thereby undermining any possible objections the non-English nations might have. As a result, we get Ray’s passionate claim, ‘we’re all the same country’, whilst at the same time, he castigates those responsible for the booing as ‘fucking Jocks’. Notice also how the other group members immediately pick up on this argument, employing a narrative of victimisation that contrasts (perceived) Scottish racism with the more supportive stance of the English towards ‘them’. 

As well as prompting the use of ‘them’ and ‘us’ categories, these debates also tended to focus attention on the (presumed) inequities of existing political and economic arrangements. This idea is expressed in the following extract, where devolution is again defined as something un-necessary, a process that upsets or unsettles what was considered, by many, to be a satisfactory system. 

Interviewer: What about the relationship between Britain and England and the rest of the, do you think … 

Derek: They’re further apart now ….

Tom: Yeah, I think so. Yeah. I mean, I think things like devolution of .. uh .. of Scotland ….

Derek: .. Wales.

Tom: … Wales as well.

Derek: Well, that was a silly, silly, that’s driven a wedge between, between neighbours isn’t it? It’s like building a, planting a conifer hedge ….

Kathy: Yes, it is, honestly. I was laughing at the analogy. 

Derek: Yeah. And, and nobody’s got the guts to cut the hedge down. The fact that we’ve got more bloody Scottish men in the, in the … cabinet …

Tom: .. that’s right …

Derek: … than we’ve ever had. And now they’ve got a right to vote on things for us (Doncaster Group) 

In this exchange, we see a complex political process reduced to something as insignificant and ‘silly’ as a squabble between neighbours (with the respective nations being anthropomorphised into actual people). This analogy not only belittles Scottish aspirations to nationhood but also places the two groups on equal terms. Furthermore, Scottish autonomy is seen to be the direct result of the inability or unwillingness of English elites to restore the previously existing (and presumably more rational) state of affairs. This is a common complaint among members of the majority English who argue that social and political elites tend to privilege minority interests (whether national, ethnic or otherwise) over themselves (Hewitt, 2005). 

This fairly benign opening is then supplanted by a far more passionately articulated sense of injustice, in which the ‘foreign’ nationality of the government is listed as the underlying problem and its repercussions for ‘us’ (that is, the English) outlined, with reference to the West Lothian question (‘they’ve got a right to vote on things for us’). In this way, we see a shift from the portrayal of an equal partnership of nations in Britain to a fairly well documented ‘them’ and ‘us’ framework where the ‘other’ is (seen to be) privileged at ‘our’ expense. 

Interestingly, those who discussed relations between the constituent nations of Britain without prompting often focused on the suppression of Englishness by Scottish elites. The following extract was preceded by an extended discussion about St George’s Day, with one of the group, Diana, explaining how a local pub had been banned from celebrating the event. In talking about the marginalisation of the English, the group then pointed to the over-representation of Scots in the media and parliament. 

Edna: No, on all the, the presenters and people [on the BBC], the Scottish.

Frank: Oh, the Scots. 

Edna .. have you noticed this?

Diana: How many Scottish MP’s are their standing in ….

Edna: Yeah, yeah. 

Diana: .. representing the population of how many? … The actual legal, or the way this country is governed is fundamentally biased. The fact that the prime minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 

Edna: .. they’re all ….

Frank: .. you, you just do a head count round ….

Edna: .. and they’re all Scottish.

Diana: .. they’re all Scottish  (Liverpool Group) 

The way in which Frank responds to Edna’s initial assertion with the comment, ‘Oh, the Scots’ indicates that this is an issue that he has been aware of or discussed before. The fact that the group then colludes in building an argument against Scottish over-representation in the media and politics is striking, as if this is something that they have all perceived independently and are now enthusiastically confirming through a joint discussion. In this way, the process of devolution becomes a focus for English disquiet about the perceived imbalance in relations between the constituent nations of Britain. This idea was most frequently discussed in relation to the influence of Scottish politicians within the British political system. 

Norman: The government’s setting out to, to knock down all ….

Gerard: Undermine Englishness. 

Jack: Yeah.
Interviewer: But why would they do that? 

Norman: Because they’re Scotsmen! (Hastings Group) 

Members of the Hastings Group trade in a broad conspiracy about the infiltration of the government by Scottish elites, which has become a popular refrain among English nationalists (an admittedly small group). However, it is the sense of injustice, which again focuses on the (apparently) unequal relations between the Scottish and English, which needs to be emphasised. 

Whether these types of exchanges suggest the likelihood of a more permanent change in attitudes, which engender support for a new socio-political framework, is open to question (Aughey, 2010). However, what they do seem to indicate is a growing shift in the way that people, born and brought up in England, are beginning to articulate their own (national) identity in relation to ‘others’ within Britain. Furthermore, the language of ‘them’ and ‘us’ now draws on a fairly wider range of increasingly established equity markers (political representation, welfare provision, economic subsidy) that can be used to concretise the differences between in and out-groups. 

As I have already suggested, this transformation must be explicated in relation to the previously unmarked status of the English within Britain and the degree to which this dominant position has been predicated on the disavowal of nationalism (Kumar, 2000). With many established symbols and narratives of Britishness subject to increasing challenge and an idealised self-category built on the repudiation of nationalism as irrational and uncivilised (Kumar, 2000), those in England are left without symbolic forms / institutions or indeed a language with which to enter the wider debates around (national) identity and belonging now taking place. 

In the following sections, I want to suggest that events designed to celebrate English nationality, which have grown exponentially in the past decade or more, may have a significant role to play in articulating such concerns. 

‘A sense of where you belong in the world’

I was particularly interested to ask the groups I interviewed what they thought about these displays, given that all of them had agreed that they were becoming more visible when compared with the past. Two broad themes emerged. The first, which is largely beyond the scope of this paper, suggested that people in England were being duped by media campaigns and corporate interests. Others, from a wide variety of backgrounds and locales, argued that the growing visibility of such displays were a direct response to the perception that the in-groups’ sense of self and place was coming under increasing scrutiny, as the following example shows.

Peter: It [England’s world cup campaign} actually provided an outlet for people to say ‘we’re in danger of losing something’ that we value. And it’s being eroded over time. 

Interviewer: And what’s been lost, do you think?

Diana: I think, I think what’s been lost is a sense of pride, a sense of where you belong in the world in terms of history, context 

Here, the phrase ‘eroded over time’ points to the fact that long-term, albeit hazily defined, changes are beginning to generate a response among some sections of the English population. The statement also reinforces the idea that such events represent a ‘space’ where individuals can manage wider feelings of uncertainty or loss, by actively embodying and, thereby, re-presenting the ‘imagined community’ of the nation. The political commentator David Goodhart makes a similar observation when he writes, ‘there is … no formal English political community, one of the reasons why sport has become such a rallying point for expressions of English identity’ (2008).

An important feature of these types of debates was the degree to which this sense of loss was linked to the actions or presence of ‘other’ groups who threatened established identities, traditions and ways of life. In Britain, these forms of ‘ressentiment nationalism’ have tended to focus on visible ‘ethnic minorities’ (Gilroy, 2004) and, in more recent times, Muslims (Poole, 2002). 

However, what is also interesting to observe is the extent to which these discussions also referenced the changing political landscape within Britain and, in particular, the increasing assertiveness of the Scots, Welsh and Irish.  For example, members of the South Shields Groups drew specific attention to the increasing irrelevance of the ‘union’ when discussing the multitude of English flags being flown across the country.

Interviewer: This summer during the world cup we saw flags being displayed on cars, pubs and houses. What do you put that down to, this sudden display of the St George’s Cross? 

Neil: That we won’t bring the Union Jack, we need, we need the St George’s flag. 

Edward: Well, I’d say the Welsh have got their own standards and the Scots got their own, got their own flag flying, flying, so I suppose, the Union Jack hasn’t got much to brag about has it?

Charlie: Well it’s, it’s a union of four countries.

Edward: Well, we’re not a union now though. We’re not, we’re not a union (emphasis added) 

In this case, Neil and Edward articulate a direct link between the failing union, as represented by the irrelevance of the Union Jack (the flag of Britain) and the increasing visibility of the St George’s Cross (the flag of England). Furthermore, Neil also suggests that there may be a ‘need’ for an exclusive English symbol to replace the empty signifier of the ‘Union Jack’, which has been largely devalued by other nationalist groups. This also ties in rather well with Diana’s lament about the loss of a sense of pride, history and context, which, for many English people was inked to British history, traditions and prestige. 

‘I woke up English’

In a similar vein, the organisers of (admittedly small-scale) events designed to celebrate St George’s Day I interviewed, all suggested that they had been largely inspired by the increased visibility of other British national groups and/or devolution, itself. 

Greg: Yeah … um … three years ago we started the  … erm … started the St George’s Day events … which I suppose was in response to the fact that Ken Livingstone had decided to, you know the story, put £100,000 into a St Patrick’s Day parade.

Dave: People are getting fed up with people flogging St Patrick’s Day and St Andrew’s Day and not allowing St George’s Day. You put a St George’s Day flag up and they call it racialist (Interview 1, Covent Garden) 

Interviewer: What were the reasons for you coming here?

Frank: Uh … because the 1997 devolution settlement made me much more conscious of being English than I had previously. 

Interviewer: Right. 

Frank: The English have a reputation for not celebrating their national saint’s day .. erm … and actually for identifying themselves as British … which .. uh … was a fair enough thing to do until 1997. It is not any longer a viable option. 

Me: And … why is that?

Frank: Because what happened in 1997 was …  that changed the whole deal in these islands … erm … I went to bed on the night of the referendum British and woke up English (Interview 2, Covent Garden) 

It’s important to note that these people remain exceptional in their willingness to actively organise and participate in such events. For instance, of the people I spoke to, a very small proportion had done anything at all on St George’s Day and the majority simply went to the pub. At the same time, even those who did not actively participate in the event, suggested that the English should celebrate their identity more given the resurgence of Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism, and the perceived neglect of the English in the post-devolution era. 

Susan: We could do with some more bank holidays, we don’t have enough bank holidays, personal opinion, compared to other Europeans, we can’t we have theirs, y’know, and have it on St George’s, yes.

Simon: Yeah, that would be good, have it on St George’s Day, we celebrate St Patrick’s Day.

Susan: And, and St David’s Day and …. St Andrew’s Day. Burns Night, for people in Scotland. We don’t have anything (Devon Group) 

Sandra: I think gradually we are because, I think the Scots celebrate …

Jackie: Yes. 

Sandra: … St Andrews Day. And the Irish certainly do St Patrick’s … um … I think, gradually we’re thinking, well, perhaps we should be doing it more …

Jackie: We should do.

Roger: But we haven’t been encouraged to (Middlesex Group) 

Sarah: Because I feel …again, that they, they see the Welsh and the Scottish celebrating their national days and think, ‘well, why the hell aren’t we?’ (Cheltenham Group) 

Almost all of these extracts are defined by a degree of ambivalence towards celebrating George’s Day. However, it is interesting to see the extent to which the statements follow a pattern, first noting the fact that ‘others’ within Britain celebrate their identity and then, albeit guardedly, proposing that the English should do likewise. 

The first exchange is initially defined in relation to a wider European context and the lack of paid holidays that the English have relative to others within the EU. In this case, however, there is a noticeable shift in emphasis with the discussion coming to focus on issues of relative equity between the constituent nations of Britain. The second is again marked by rather non-committal language, notably Paula’s use of the hedge, ‘well, perhaps’, and as in previous examples points to a gradual change in English attitudes as a result of Scottish and Irish exemplars. The idea that the in-group needs encouraging is also interesting, perhaps partly reflecting the lack of English institutions to ‘lead’ such processes, notably when compared with the Scots and Welsh who are now served by dedicated political apparatuses. 

Finally, Sarah’s comment offers a similar perspective but unlike the other interviewee’s she places herself outside of the group that is responding to the Scots and Welsh celebrations. Often these acts of distancing are used to direct opprobrium at those who take part in such practices as uncouth or uncivilised. For instance, some interviewee’s defined the display of English flags as ‘shit and chavvy’. In this case, however, Sarah, far from critiquing those who participate in such events, provides a rationale for their actions. Again, there is a sense that these displays are being increasingly viewed as valid, even for those who define themselves as non-participants. 

Therefore, while we should be somewhat wary about attributing too much significance to these debates, they do focus again on the relationship between the constituent nations within Britain. They also offer some evidence for the apparent tensions that now seem to be emerging in relation to established definitions of Englishness, which have paradoxically downplayed the importance of nationality (Kumar, 2000). This stands in contrast to a growing willingness to engage in more overt displays of nationality, which may be viewed as an attempt to re-assert a sense of (group) identity and place within the increasingly contested symbolic and political landscape of Britain. 

Conclusion

This paper has explored the ways in which members of the ‘ethnic majority’ in England discuss the relations between the constituent nations of Britain in the post-devolution era. I have suggested a noticeable, if sometimes tentative, shift between, what we might call, a language of ‘complacent thoughtlessness’ (Condor, 2006: 678), where English hegemony was both taken-for-granted and the source of advantage/certainty, and a more reflexive engagement with these issues, with narratives of victimisation moving to the fore. 

Building on Tom Nairn’s assertion that the English institutions and symbolic forms were largely neglected in favour of a British framework, it is now suggested that English people are ‘feeling increasingly dislocated, increasingly isolated on an island that they had previously regarded as theirs’ (Kumar, 2003:268). Compounding this unease is a relatively strong sense of identity among the other British nations who are in many cases able to define themselves in relation to the majority English. This group is therefore faced with a double-bind. They are not only threatened with the loss of an important source of stability and pride, but are also required to address key ontological questions concerning identity and belonging without few established institutions or even a language with which to enter these sometimes fractious debates. 

This changing position can be partially evidenced by the shift from British to English categories of identity and also in the ways in which a language of (in)equity is being used to mark the distinctions between England and the devolved nations with Britain. These discussions tend to focus on the political (the West Lothian question and the lack of an English parliament), economic (the Barnett formula and the provision of welfare across the different nations) and cultural spheres (the promotion of Scots, Welsh and Irish practices, symbols and events at the expense of the English). This suggests the rise of a form of ‘ressentiment nationalism’, where a dominant majority perceives its’ once taken-for-granted position to be under threat from minority groups (Brown, 2008).

The recent rise in displays of English nationality has also been analysed in relation to these (and other notable) shifts within contemporary Britain. In this case, there seems to be a growing tension between established definitions of Englishness, which define such displays as inappropriate and shameful (Condor & Abell, 2006), and those in England who increasingly feel the need to re-assert their own group’s status. This is done with reference to English symbols as Britain is increasingly seen to be a redundant or empty signifier, partly because of devolutionary processes. 

In broader theoretical terms, we can emphasise the significance of wider structural transformation in challenging, what Bourdieu labels as, an established ‘field of doxa (2006: 166), that which is taken-for-granted or beyond question. Here, it is a combination of internal political processes (devolution) and external shifts (de-colonisation, migration, multiculturalism, European federation) that are beginning to unsettle the previously dominant and (relatively) stable position of the English within Britain (Gilroy, 2004, Hewitt, 2005). In both these cases, we may be witnessing a gradual retreat from the category of British, as a means of re-formulating the ethnic majority’s dominant status within the wider debates over (national) belonging and entitlements. 

The final point that I want to make here is that for reasons of brevity I haven’t been able to explore the full range of meanings associated with terms such as ‘the English, ‘ethnic minorities’ and the Scots. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to the ways in which attitudes towards issues of identity and belonging in Britain at large, shift across categories of age, gender, ethnicity and region​[6]​. Only then we will be better able to predict whether the growing English sensitivities over devolution, indicated in this paper, will transform into organised social and political action.  
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^1	  I am focusing on processes of devolution in Britain for two primary reasons. First, the complexities of the Northern Irish situation place it beyond the scope of this paper and second, my respondents primarily discussed the issue of devolution in relation to Scotland and Wales. 
^2	  Although, see, Byrne, 2006, Fenton, 2007, Mann & Fenton, 2009, Clarke et al, 2009. 
^3	  It is arguable that the Labour government, with its strongholds in Wales, Scotland and the industrial towns of northern England, would be threatened as a political force in England – the seat of political and economic power - should Britain fragment. 
^4	  For example, a front-page story in the Daily Mail entitled ‘Divided Kingdom’ outlined the range of social benefits available to Scots but not the English. Inside, the paper wondered whether this ‘new apartheid’ would ‘shatter 300 years of union’ (16/06/07: 1/14-15, see also, Heffer, 17/05/06, Anderson, 03/07/06). 
^5	  Almost identical views are expressed by English respondents in studies carried out by Fenton (2007: 330) and Clarke et al (2009: 149). 
^6	  Survey data indicates that there is relatively little variation in attitudes towards devolution across the different regions of England (Curtice, 2006). However, working-class respondents are more likely to define themselves as English than middle-class and ethnic minorities still tend to identify as British rather than English (Stone & Muir, 2007). 
